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ABSTRACT

Evaluation of an event detection system to identify spill events
related to Marcellus Shale development
Joseph C. Wickline
There has been an extraordinary growth in the production of natural gas within the Marcellus
Shale region in the past two decades. This sharp increase in production corresponds to an
increased risk to surface waters from spill events related to the industry. At present, there are
some private organizations and government agencies which monitor water quality in the region
using continuous monitoring. However, there are no protocols in place to use data from
continuous monitoring stations to quickly detect contamination resulting from spills.
Previous research has found that standard water quality parameters, such as specific
conductivity, pH, and dissolved oxygen, measured by “off the shelf” water quality sensors are
affected by commonly spilled materials from the natural gas industry. However, it was also
found that due to expected low concentrations at monitoring stations, the effects of pollutants on
these parameters are not strong enough to use simple threshold value methods to detect
contaminants. Thus, there is a need for detection of subtle changes in water quality data which
are not congruent with background behavior. The overall objective of this work was to add to the
understanding of event detection related to surface spill events resulting from the development of
Marcellus Shale.
Municipal water distribution networks commonly deploy event detection systems (EDS) to
detect accidental or malicious contamination. The application of EDS in natural systems is less
common. In this study, a publicly available EDS, “CANARY”, was applied to water quality data
from natural channels to evaluate its ability to detect spill events and its overall performance
when applied to a natural system.
Two approaches were used to test event detection capabilities: historical events and a simulated
event. First, water quality data from three streams in the Susquehanna River Basin Commission
(SRBC) remote water quality monitoring network (RWQMN) which had a spill event (i.e.,
production water, flowback fluid, and drilling mud) in the watershed were analyzed using
CANARY. Then, a contamination event was imposed on water quality data from one
uncontaminated stream and analyzed. For spills of flowback and production fluid, events were
detected during the week following the spills. However, the algorithms detecting these events
produced too many false alarms throughout the data set to confidently attribute these events to
the spills. For the drilling mud spill, the only event detected was the result of a sensor
malfunction. Therefore, the historical events were not detected. The simulated flowback fluid
spill was also not detected. It was therefore concluded that the contaminant concentrations at the
sensors were too low for detection. This further demonstrates the need for more extensive water
quality monitoring networks in watersheds of concern. Decreasing the distance from spill events
to sensors, and optimizing configuration parameters could provide a viable protocol for detecting
acute contamination events resulting from natural gas development in the Marcellus Shale.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Justification
The natural gas industry has rapidly developed in the past two decades with the advent of
horizontal drilling and high volume hydraulic fracturing techniques (Rodriguez and Soeder
2015). The Appalachian region overlaying the Marcellus Shale formation has been especially
subject to this growth due to quantity of obtainable natural gas (Soeder and Kapell 2009).
Hazards to water resources grow in proportion to this industry due to the nature of natural gas
extraction techniques (Brantley et al. 2014). According the US EPA (2016), hazards to water
resources from the natural gas industry can be lumped into four major categories: 1) water
acquisition, 2) chemical mixing, 3) flow back and produced water, and 4) wastewater
management and disposal. Flow back and produced waters can impose major threats to water
resources when released into the natural environment during accidental spill events. Potential
effects of these events are degradation of aquatic habitat, and contamination of ground and
surface water drinking resources (Papoulias and Velasco 2013; US EPA 2016). Therefore,
awareness and appropriate response to these events should be as timely as possible.
Previous work by Harris et al. (2016) has shown that typical water quality parameters, as
measured by “off the shelf” sensors, respond when commonly spilled chemicals are introduced
into the sample area. Therefore, it may be possible to detect accidental contamination events
utilizing a high frequency continuous water quality monitoring network. However, due to
dispersion across the distance traveled by spilled materials, using threshold values to detect
contamination are likely ineffective. Harris et al. (2016) instead recommended analyzing data for
shifts not concurrent with recent background data. Thus the goal of this research was to develop
and evaluate methods of contamination detection aligned with these recommendations.
CANARY event detection software is publicly available software developed by the US
EPA in conjunction with Sandia Corporation Laboratories (US EPA 2010). CANARY was
developed for implementation into municipal distribution networks to provide drinking water
security. While CANARY can be used to detect events based on exceedance thresholds, it also
utilizes algorithms that detect events within the normal range of fluctuations for the data set. It
does so by comparing the most recently measured event to a specified period of background data.
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Based on the recommendations from Harris et al. (2016), these methods could also be useful for
detection of contamination events in a natural system.
Several event detection methods have been developed and implemented in event
detection systems (Storey et al. 2011; Hou et al. 2013; Che and Liu 2014). Most of these systems
have been developed by private entities for municipal water distribution systems to monitor these
systems for accidental or malicious contamination. In most of these instances, the event detection
software is not available to the public. Fewer cases exist where event detection systems have
been implemented in the natural environment. The cases which do, do not implement this tool
for the purposes described previously. Therefore, it could be of great interest to implement such
as system on a data set from a natural system which has been exposed to contamination.
1.2 Goals and Objectives
Continuous water quality monitoring and spill reports are used to determine the impact of
the development of the Marcellus Shale (Betanzo et al. 2016); however, there is little guidance to
detect acute spill events (Harris et al., 2016). The overall objective of this work was to add to the
understanding of event detection related to surface spill events resulting from the development of
Marcellus Shale. I hypothesize that standardized methods utilized in municipal water
applications may detect spills related to natural gas development (i.e., produced water, flowback
fluid, or drilling mud). The goals of this research were to:
1.

Determine if standardized methods utilized in municipal water applications
could identify known spill events of produced water, flowback fluid, or drilling
mud.

2.

Determine if standardized methods utilized in municipal water application
could identify a simulated spill event.

1.3 Study Design
First, one year of water quality data was retrieved from the Susquehanna River Basin
Commission (SRBC) Remote Water Quality Monitoring Network (RWQMN) for three sites with
the following criteria: i) experienced a natural gas related spill event within the watershed large
enough to create concentrations at the monitoring station greater than 1 ppm, and ii) exisitng
monitoring data measured at a 5-minute interval. Next, the data sets were analyzed with
CANARY, varying the input parameters each time. Finally, the resulting outputs were analyzed
2

to determine if the documented spill event was detected for any of the parameter configurations,
and how the detection software performance changes (number of false alarms triggered) with
variations to the parameters.
Because of there is some uncertainty regarding the details of the spill events and whether
or not a measureable response should be expected, another analysis was completed. This time,
instead of using a dataset with a known event in the watershed, a dataset with no known events
was retrieved. Again, an entire year of data was downloaded whose measurements are taken at a
5-minute interval. For this dataset, a contamination event resembling that of what has been
previously described was simulated on an arbitrarily chosen date. Once the simulated event was
added, the dataset was analyzed with CANARY utilizing the same parameter variations used for
the first three datasets. These outputs were analyzed to determine if the simulated event was
detected, and further contribute to the analysis of CANARY’s behavior on data from a natural
system.
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Development of Marcellus Shale
The Marcellus Shale is a geologic formation rich in natural gas and underlies much of
New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and eastern Ohio of the United States (Soeder and
Kapell 2009). Until recently, extraction of the natural gas from the shale was not economically
feasible. Advances in horizontal drilling and high volume hydraulic fracturing (HVHF) in the
early 2000s made natural gas extraction profitable (Rodriguez and Soeder 2015). In 2015, more
than 4.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas was produced in Pennsylvania, resulting in a 5,769%
increase in natural gas production since 2009 (PA DEP 2016).
While the rapid growth of the natural gas industry in this region is economically
beneficial, the extent of its environmental impact is unknown, and the impact to water resources
remains a concern (Brantley et al. 2014). The effects of HVHF on groundwater resources are still
being determined, but the quantity of water used and wastewater and byproducts produced in
HVHF are much more certain. Each well uses approximately 2-7 million gallons of source water
(Entrekin et al. 2011) and, in the Susquehanna River Basin of the Marcellus Shale region,
produces up to 1.3 million gallons of wastewater (US EPA 2016). This wastewater is typically
reused in the hydraulic fracturing process, disposed of in wastewater injection wells, or
discharged into adjacent rivers or streams either untreated or treated by a wastewater treatment
plant (US EPA 2016). Although most discharged wastewater is treated, some studies have shown
that it still poses a threat to water quality (Rozell and Reaven 2012). Wastewater which is
disposed of via injection wells has also been found to impact surface water quality. Kassotis et
al. (2015) found a significant increase in the concentration of endocrine disruptors downstream
of a West Virginia wastewater injection well which accepts by wastes from HVHF operations.
Other contamination of surface waters occurs when byproducts of HVHF are accidentally spilled
or intentionally dumped and flow into surface waters. According to Brantley et al. (2014), wastes
from HVHF wells that have potential to contaminate surface waters via spilling in quantities
greater than 400 gallons are: flowback water, produced water, fracture fluids, and drilling fluids.
These spills typically result from trucking accidents, well blowouts, or leaking tanks, valves, or
pipes.
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2.2 Effects of spills on water resources
Spills into surface waters can be detrimental to local ecosystems and create problems for
drinking water supply. Papoulias and Velasco (2013) reported that the release of HVHF
chemicals into Acorn Fork, KY reduced the pH from 7.5 to 5.6, and increased the specific
conductivity from 200 µS/cm to 35,000 µS/cm. These changes in water quality were harmful,
and in some cases deadly to the fish and invertebrates of the stream, including the threatened
black nosed dace. Kentucky water quality standards mandate that pH remain in the range of 6.0
to 9.0 and not change by more than 1.0 in any 24-hour time period. In addition, these standards
mandate that specific conductance not increase or decrease to levels that will adversely affect
indigenous species (State of Kentucky 2017).
Cozzarelli et al. (2017) documented the effects of an 11.4 ML wastewater spill from an
unconventional oil and gas (UOG) pipeline in Blacktail Creek, North Dakota which occurred in
January 2015. Chemical contaminants measured in the soil and water were found in higher
concentrations downstream of the spill site compared to samples taken upstream of the spill.
February water samples showed elevated levels of chloride and bromide downstream of the spill
site. Lithium, boron, and strontium were present downstream at levels 5 to 10 times higher than
those upstream of the spill. A persistent thermogenic source of methane was detected
downstream of the spill by the presence of light hydrocarbons. Persistent sediment contamination
was also detected; barium and strontium concentration were both higher downstream of the spill.
Radium activity was found to be 15 times higher downstream of the spill, and due to Sr isotope
ratios, are believed to be the result of the leaking pipeline. Biological health effects demonstrate
the effects of the spill, even months after attempts at remediation. Fish bioassays indicate 89%
survival upstream of the spill, compared to 2.5% survival downstream of the spill. Finally,
biological impacts resulting from endocrine disruption were detected downstream of the spill.
The findings of Cozzarelli et al. (2017) demonstrate that surface spills have the potential to
create long term issues for ecosystem health and water quality
2.3 Current monitoring strategies
Current monitoring strategies for surface spills related to Marcellus Shale development
vary depending on the watershed and state monitoring agency. The Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection (PA DEP) currently relies on reports from well operators or
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anonymous citizens (PA DEP 2017a). The PA DEP also has continuous instream monitoring
(CIM) stations which are temporarily deployed into streams of concern. These stations are
typically deployed for one year but may be deployed for a shorter period in special cases (PA
DEP 2017b). Surface waters are otherwise monitored at fixed stations as part of the
Pennsylvania Water Quality Network (WQN). The WQN includes three types of monitoring
stations: Standard, Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Loading, and Reference Streams. These stations are
sampled monthly or bimonthly, and in 2010 116 stations had chemistry constituents specific to
oil and gas signatures added to the list of monitored parameters (PA DEP 2017c).
Similar to the PA DEP, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WV
DEP) has an Ambient Water Quality Monitoring (AWQM) Network which includes 26 fixed
(long-term) stations at the mouths of West Virginia’s larger streams and rivers and are sampled
bi-monthly (WV DEP 2017a). The WV DEP also has deployable continuous monitoring stations
which are used in particular projects where understanding temporal variation is crucial (WV
DEP 2017a). As of the time of this writing, the WV DEP has not added any monitored chemical
parameters which may be specific signatures of contamination resulting from oil and gas activity.
The New York Department of Environmental Conservation (NY DEC) implements
Rotating Integrated Basin Studies (RIBS) to monitor water quality through the state of New
York. Under RIBS, each major basin within the state is intensively monitored every five years.
These intensive study results are then compared to baseline conditions established by The
Routine Trend Monitoring Network, which monitors the basic water quality characteristics
within all basins, every year, regardless of where intensive sampling is being conducted (NY
DEC 2017a). At the time of this writing, the only continuous monitoring network currently
implemented in the state of New York is employed by the Susquehanna River Basin Commission
(SRBC) who monitors the sub watersheds of the Susquehanna River Basin with their Remote
Water Quality Monitoring Network (RWQMN). Due to the geographic nature of the
Susquehanna River Basin, this network extends from New York into much of Pennsylvania. The
RWQMN was established to monitor the impact of oil and gas production activities on the
basin’s surface waters. (SRBC 2017).
Currently, information regarding water quality monitoring strategies in Ohio is not
extensive. According to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OH EPA), five to seven
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areas of the state are monitored each year. A total of 400 to 450 sampling sites are examined, of
which each site is visited more than once (OH EPA 2017a). The primary goal of this monitoring
program is to establish and regulate the Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) as required by
the US EPA. At present, there are no additional monitoring programs implemented by the OH
EPA which seek to monitor the impacts of oil and gas development in the state.
Only Pennsylvania has a government monitoring agency which monitors for chemical
inputs related to UOG development in the Marcellus Shale play (PA DEP 2017c). However, the
PA DEP samples streams bimonthly at the most, a frequency which is likely not great enough to
present acute events, such as a spill (Kirchner et al. 2004). The SRBC is the only entity which
deploys continuous monitoring year-round throughout a watershed within the region with the
intention of monitoring the effects UOG development has on water quality (SRBC 2017).
However, the only protocol to date for all entities to detect spill events is by means of selfreporting by UOG development companies, or anonymous reporting by local citizens (PA DEP
2017a, WV DEP 2017b, NY DEC 2017b, OH EPA 2017b). Thus there is a need to have the
ability to detect spill events using continuous monitoring data, which in turn creates a greater
need for remote continuous water quality monitoring networks.
2.4 Prior work using threshold values to detect spills
Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) found that detecting surface spills using threshold values of
common surface water parameters is largely ineffective. The high variability of water quality
requires knowledge an understanding of the background levels of water quality in order to detect
contamination with statistical significance (Harris et al. 2016a, 2016b). Harris et al. (2016a,
2016b) found that commonly measured water quality parameters showed promise in detecting
spill events: i) specific conductance for produced water, drilling mud, and ethylene glycol, ii)
dissolved oxygen for drilling mud and ethylene glycol, and iii) pH for produced water and
drilling mud at lower concentrations. The authors recommended these parameters be monitored
in conjunction with continuous monitoring as relative change in the aforementioned parameters
may be more crucial in detecting spills than the exceedance of threshold values (Harris et al.
2016a, 2016b).
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2.5 Event Detection Systems
Event detection systems (EDS) or Early Warning Systems (EWS) have gained significant
interest and attention in water quality monitoring in recent years (Storey et al. 2011). In general,
an EDS is a computer program which takes incoming data from a monitoring station or a
network of monitoring stations and analyzes the data with mathematic and statistical methods to
determine if the incoming measurement is somehow different from previous measurements (US
EPA 2010, Hou et al. 2013,). The majority of work in the field of water quality EDS is done in
municipal distribution networks with the goal of providing water security (Ostfeld and Salomon
2005, US EPA 2010). Few instances currently exist in the literature where an EDS has been
implemented in a natural system, such as a lake, stream, or estuary. Glasglow et al. (2004) have
shown an EDS can be useful in monitoring dissolved oxygen in estuaries for algal blooms.
2.5.1 CANARY Event Detection System
Currently, most EDS are proprietary and not publicly available (US EPA 2010).
However, the US EPA and Sandia Corporation Laboratories recently developed an EDS which is
freely available. This EDS is called CANARY and, similar to most other EDS, was developed
with the purpose of providing water security in light of the events that occurred on September
11, 2001 (US EPA 2010). However, the event detection methodology utilized by CANARY have
potential to be useful for detecting acute pollution events in the natural environment. A major
goal in the creation of CANARY was to develop an EDS which could detect contamination
events in the subtle fluctuations of water quality time series, where threshold tests are less
meaningful (US EPA 2010). CANARY can be used to monitor water quality in real-time, and to
process historical data. Processing historical data in CANARY is commonly referred to as “batch
processing”; this is the type of analysis which will be discussed for the remainder of this
document.
Data processing in CANARY can be broken down into three major phases: read
incoming data, utilize algorithms to decide if the most recent measurement is consistent with
recent data or is an outlier, and determine whether or not an event has occurred with a binomial
event discriminator (BED). For each CANARY analysis, a “YAML Ain’t Markup Language”, or
YML, configuration file must be specified. This configuration file specifies real-time or batch
processing, the dataset to be analyzed and its corresponding measurement interval, and if each
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signal should be analyzed as a regular water quality parameter (used in event detection), an
operational parameter (not used in event detection), or a calibration parameter (referenced in
event detection to reduce false alarm rate). The configuration file also specifies which algorithms
should be used to compute the residual used for event detection, and algorithm parameters which
control the sensitivity of event detection. Additionally, the configuration file enables the user to
request specialized output files, and, in the case of a water quality monitoring network, which
stations should be analyzed. A more extensive overview of the CANARY configuration file is
provided by the US EPA (2012).
During the first stage of analysis, data from a specified comma separated value (CSV)
file is read by the program at the user specified measurement interval. This interval must be
specified so the program can appropriately account for gaps in the dataset resulting from faulty
or disabled sensors. While any measurement interval can be entered and analyzed, it is
recommended to use data measured from 2 to 15-minute intervals (US EPA 2012).
For the second phase of analysis, CANARY has three built-in algorithms for analysis:
set-point, linear prediction-correction filter (LPCF), and multivariate nearest neighbor (MVNN).
Additionally, CANARY is capable of utilizing custom algorithms written in JAVA. More
information on custom algorithms, including an example is provided by US EPA (2012).
The set-point algorithm allows the user to specify a distance from a set point that
incoming measurements should not exceed. Essentially, the set-point algorithm allows the user to
define the maximum and minimum threshold values to declare an event by establishing the
maximum distance (positive or negative) that measurements may vary from the given set-point.
Harris et al. (2016) suggested that threshold values are likely inadequate for event detection in
the context of this study. Therefore, the remainder of this discussion will focus on the LPCF and
MVNN algorithms provided by CANARY.
Both the LPCF and MVNN algorithms require user specified parameters which define the
sensitivity of event detection and timing of event reporting. The required parameters are: history
window, outlier threshold, event threshold, event timeout, and event window save. The event
timeout parameter specifies how many time steps that may pass before an alarm is silenced, and
the event window save parameter specifies the amount of time the program should allow to pass
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before reporting an event that has been detected. These two parameters do not affect event
detection; rather they allow an operator to adjust how events are reported. More important in the
context of this study are those parameters whose values alter the sensitivity of event detection.
The history window specifies the number of prior time steps the algorithm uses as historical data.
The history window is dynamic, and is used to compute statistics used in event detection, such as
standard deviation. For both the LPCF and MVNN algorithms, data in the history window is
normalized using a standard Z-transformation function. The outlier threshold specifies the
number of standard deviations that the measured value must differ from the expected value in
order for the current time step to be declared an outlier. The event threshold specifies the
probability that must be exceeded by the BED before a series of outliers are called an event.
In the configuration file, parameters for the BED are specified with each algorithm used.
The two required parameters are the BED window, and the outlier probability. The BED window
is the number of previous time steps that are included in computing the probability of an event at
each time step. The BED window must be less than the history window. Additionally,
considerations for setting the BED window should be: the expected duration of the
contamination event to be detected, the desired sensitivity of detection, and the desired alarm
response time (US EPA 2010, 2014).
Before the BED is used to determine if an event has occurred, a residual value must be
produced by the predictive or comparative algorithm. The LPCF algorithm is essentially an
autoregressive (AR) model which uses historical data to predict the measurement at the present
time step (Figure 1). Then the absolute value of the difference between the predicted and
measured value is calculated; this is the residual. Finally, the LPCF algorithm compares the
residual against the user specified outlier threshold. If the residual exceeds the outlier threshold,
then that particular measurement is declared an outlier. Because the LPCF algorithm computes a
residual for each incoming water quality signal, the signal responsible for declaring a time step
an outlier can be easily determined (US EPA 2010).
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Predicted

Water Quality Value

Measured

History Window
Residual

If residual > outlier
threshold, time step is
called an outlier.

Time

Figure 1. A conceptualization of the LPCF algorithm. The standard deviation from the
user specified history window is computed at each time step and used for
user the specified outlier threshold.
Unlike the LPCF algorithm, the MVNN algorithm does not predict a future value.
Instead, the MVNN algorithm combines all an analyzed data points into a multi-dimensional
space where the measurement for each analyzed parameter is a component of the coordinates
(Figure 2). Then, the Euclidean distance from the most recently received measurement and the
nearest value from historical data is computed as the residual. Then, similar to the LPCF
algorithm, the residual is compared to the user specified outlier threshold; the present time step is
declared an outlier if the residual exceeds the outlier threshold. The nature of the MVNN
algorithm does not allow for explicit determination of which signal(s) contributed to declaring a
time step an outlier. However, CANARY implements a maximum residual classification within
the MVNN algorithm which determines the maximum residual across all sensors, and therefore
which signals were responsible for the outlier (US EPA 2010).
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Figure 2. The MVNN algorithm for a single history window. An example history window with
576 data points with normalized specific conductivity, pH, and dissolved oxygen is
shown. The red circle represents the current measurement. The residual is the 3dimensional distance from the current measurement to the next closest point.
The third and final phase of analysis is done for each algorithm. Here, a BED is used to
determine if an event has occurred. The probability of an event is computed at each time step
using the cumulative binomial distribution function. A binomial experiment requires a fixed
number of independent trials whose outcome must be either success or failure. In the context of
the CANARY EDS, an outlier is considered a failure. Thus, the probability that the current
measurement is the same as the history data is given by the following (US EPA 2010):
𝒏!

𝑷(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅) = 𝒃(𝒓; 𝒏, 𝒑) = 𝒓!(𝒏−𝒓)! 𝒑𝒓 (𝟏 − 𝒑)𝒏−𝒓

(1)

Here, r is defined as the number of failures that occurred in the given number of n trials, and p is
defined as the probability of success on any given trial. For the application in CANARY, the
BED window serves as the fixed number of trials, the number of failures is the number time
steps within the BED window which are declared outliers, and the probability for success on any
given trial is assumed to be 0.5. The complement to this equation is then the probability that an
event has occurred (US EPA 2010):
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𝑷(𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒕) = 𝟏 − 𝑷(𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒅) = 𝟏 − 𝒃(𝒓; 𝒏, 𝒑)

(2)

Finally, the cumulative binomial distribution function is used to more efficiently detect events by
ensuring that the probability of an event increases as the number of failures increases. (US EPA
2010):
𝒏(𝒓≤𝒛𝒄 )

𝑷(𝒓 ≤ 𝒛𝒄 ) = ∑𝒊=𝟏

𝒃(𝒓; 𝒏, 𝒑)

Here, zc is the probability threshold value defined by the user, and all other variables are as
previously defined. Then, if the cumulative binomial probability calculated is greater than the
specified probability threshold, CANARY declares an event has occurred at that time step.
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(3)

3.0 Methods
3.1 Data Retrieval
This study used data from the SRBC RWQMN (SRBC 2017a). These data are publicly
available on the SRBC RWQMN website. The SRBC monitors the following water quality
parameters: temperature, specific conductivity, pH, turbidity, and dissolved oxygen (Table 1).
All data used in this study was measured at a 5-minute interval. Multiple sites with differing
years were assessed. For each site, an entire calendar year of data was downloaded and analyzed.
Therefore, each data set began on January 1 of the selected year at time step 00:00:00 and ends
on December 31 of the same year at time step 23:55:00.
Table 1. Parameters that are monitored by the SRBC RWQMN, their respective units of
measurement, and precision of measurement.
Parameter
Temperature
Specific Conductivity
pH
Turbidity
Dissolved Oxygen

Units
°C
mS/cm
Standard Units
NTU+
mg/L

Precision
Hundredths
Thousandths
Hundredths
Hundredths
Hundredths

3.2 Case Studies
The goal of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the CANARY EDS in
detecting acute contamination events resulting from natural gas development in the Marcellus
Shale. To accomplish this goal, a two-fold approach was implemented. First, case studies of
historic acute contamination events were evaluated. The chosen case studies must have
conformed to the following criteria:
•

An acute contamination event sizable enough to produce estimated peak
concentrations of at least 1.0 ppm at the sensor must have occurred within the
watershed

•

Event must have occurred within a watershed which is continuously monitored by
the SRBC to ensure the availability of data

•

5-minute interval continuously monitored data must be available during the year
in which the event occurred
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The criteria for concentrations of at least 1.0 ppm are from the work of Harris et al.
(2016a, 2016b), which stated that typical water quality parameters will respond to concentrations
greater than or equal to 1.0 ppm. The criteria for the 5-minute interval is relevant to the
CANARY EDS for which it is recommended to use 2 to 15-minute interval data (US EPA 2010,
2012).
Case studies were chosen from reports compiled by Harris et al. (2016b), which found
events between January 2011 and early 2014, and the US EPA (2015), who found events
between January 2006 and April 2012. Additionally, Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) computed
estimated ranges of peak concentrations for each event using methods presented by Jobson
(1997). Since the SRBC RWQMN was not implemented until January 2010 (SRBC 2017a), the
two sources typically overlapped one another for the specified criteria. Only one event was found
in the report by the US EPA (2015) that was not reported by Harris et al. (2016b). However, the
sensor measurement interval was 4-hour at the time of the event, so it did not follow the criteria
for this study. Finally, given these data and set criteria, three events were selected as case studies
as described in the following sections.
3.2.1 Meshoppen Creek
The first selected case study was Meshoppen Creek, located within Susquehanna and
Wyoming Counties, PA. Meshoppen creek flows southwest into the North Branch of the
Susquehanna River. On January 10, 2011, a 23.8 m3 (150 BBL) spill of flowback fluid was
reported by the PA DEP within the Meshoppen Creek watershed (US EPA 2015; Harris et al.
2016a, 2016b). The event occurred 14 km northwest of the monitoring station which is located
east of the confluence with the Susquehanna River near Kaiserville, PA (Figure 3).Watershed
and spill event data are summarized in Table 2.
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Figure 3. Location of the Meshoppen Creek watershed, spill event, and SRBC
monitoring station.
Table 2. Watershed (SRBC 2017b) and event characteristics (Harris et al.
2016b) for the Meshoppen Creek case study.
Watershed Characteristics
Monitored Drainage
134.7
Area (km2)
Average Annual Flow
at Monitoring Station
(cms)

Event Characteristics
Flowback
Contaminant
Fluid

2.1

Vol. Spilled (m3)

23.8

Maximum Flow Time
from Headwaters (hr)

32.67

Aerial Distance to
Monitoring
Station (km)

14

Natural Gas Drilling
Pads

66

Estimated Peak
Concentration at
Sensor (ppm)

1.1–2.1

3.2.2 Hammond Creek
The next selected case study was Hammond Creek, located largely in Tioga County, PA,
with portions of the watershed extending into Bradford County, PA, and Steuben and Chemung
Counties, NY. Hammond creek flows northeast into Seeley Creek close to the PA and NY state
line. On January 26, 2011, 7.9 m3 (50 BBL) of production fluid was spilled within the Hammond
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Creek watershed (US EPA 2015; Harris et al. 2017b). The event occurred 10 km west of the
SRBC monitoring station which is located northeast of Millerton, PA, close to the confluence of
Hammond Creek with Seeley Creek (Figure 4). Watershed and event characteristics are
summarized in Table 3.

Figure 4. Location of the Seeley Creek Watershed, and the contamination
event and SRBC continuous monitoring station within the
Hammond Creek sub-watershed.
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Table 3. Watershed (SRBC 2018a) and event characteristics (Harris et al. 2016b)
for the Hammond Creek case study.
Watershed Characteristics
Monitored Drainage
75.1
Area (km2)

Event Characteristics
Production
Contaminant
Fluid

Average Annual Flow
at Monitoring Station
(cms)

1.0

Vol. Spilled (m3)

7.9

Maximum Flow Time
from Headwaters (hr)

13.52

Arial Distance to
Monitoring
Station (km)

9.9

12

Estimated Peak
Concentration at
Sensor (ppm)

0.85-1.87

Natural Gas Drilling
Pads
3.2.3 East Branch of Wyalusing Creek

The final case study selected is the East Branch of Wyalusing Creek which is located in
Susquehanna County, PA. East Branch of Wyalusing Creek flows west toward its confluence
with the Middle Branch. On October 22, 2013, 20.7 m3 (104 BBL) of drilling mud, and cement
were spilled within the watershed (US EPA 2015, Harris et al. 2016b). The event occurred 18 km
northeast of the SRBC monitoring station which is located approximately 0.40 km upstream of
the mouth near the town of Lawton, PA (Figure 5). Watershed and event characteristics are
summarized in Table 4.
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Figure 5. Location of the Wyalusing Creek Watershed, and the
contamination event and SRBC continuous monitoring station
within the East Branch sub-watershed.
Table 4. Watershed (SRBC 2018b) and event characteristics (Harris et al. 2016b)
for the East Branch of Wyalusing Creek case study.
Watershed Characteristics
Monitored Drainage
179.5
Area (km2)

Event Characteristics
Drilling Mud,
Contaminant
Cement

Average Annual Flow
at Monitoring Station
(cms)

2.9

Vol. Spilled (m3)

20.7

Maximum Flow Time
from Headwaters (hr)

20.23

Arial Distance to
Monitoring
Station (km)

18

40

Estimated Peak
Concentration at
Sensor (ppm)

0.53–1.1

Natural Gas Drilling
Pads
3.3 Simulated Event

The peak concentration estimates for each of the case studies relies on the assumption
that the full quantity of the contaminant was spilled directly into the stream. Because this
assumption cannot be confirmed, it is possible that some or all of the contaminant was contained
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before reaching the stream. Thus, it is possible that the peak concentration estimates are overestimated, or the contaminant may never reach the monitoring station at all. To ensure the
following analysis was performed on data impacted by an acute contamination event, one was
simulated using information from the Meshoppen Creek case study, prior work by Harris et al.
(2016a, 2016b), and data from the Meshoppen Creek SRBC monitoring station.
3.3.1 Site Selection
In order to mimic an acute contamination event, one of the case studies was chosen; then,
characteristics of the historical event discussed previously were utilized to simulate an event.
Following that, selection of the site for the simulated event was based on the following criteria:
•

No reported acute contamination events in the watershed for an entire year

•

Watershed must be within the SRBC RWQMN

•

5-minute measurement interval monitoring data must be available for the selected
year

Contrary to the case studies, a dataset with no reported contamination events was desired so any
events detected could be distinguished as either false alarms or a result of the simulated event.
To choose a site, data from Harris et al. (2016b) was analyzed by identifying a year where no
significant contamination events were reported. Thus, the chosen site was Meshoppen Creek
during the year 2012. There was one reported contamination event during this year;
approximately 0.3–0.5 m3 (2–3 BBL) of production fluid was spilled on January 6, 2012. This
event occurred 14 km northwest of the monitoring station and results in a peak concentration
range of 0.018–0.049 ppm (Harris et al. 2016b). Therefore, this event was considered
insignificant, and the selected site was Meshoppen Creek during the year 2012.
3.3.2 Contamination Event Simulation
Working under the assumption that the event described in Table 2 traveled directly into
the stream, methods presented by Jobson (1997) were used to simulate the event. When an acute
contamination event occurs within a stream, a fixed observer at a downstream point can expect
the concentration to rise and fall in the shape of a left-skewed bell curve (Chapra 1997, Jobson
1997). This type of response can be approximated by a scalene triangle (Figure 6) using the
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travel time of the contaminant and the estimated peak concentration (Jobson 1997). For this
simulated event, the median of the peak concentration estimates from Harris et al. (2016b) was
used as the peak concentration, and the most probable travel time was estimated using the
methods of Jobson (1997) (Table 5). Using these three points as the basis of the simulated event,
concentrations for each time step in between these values are estimated using linear regressions
developed in Figure 6.
Table 5. Most probable travel time and concentration estimates for the 2011 Meshoppen
creek event used for simulation in 2012.

Spill
Event

Leading Edge
of Plume
Reaches
Sensor

Peak
Concentration
Reaches Sensor

Concentration
Reduced to
10% of Peak
Concentration

Most Probable
Time (hr)

0

33.4

37.6

46.0

Concentration at
Monitoring
Station (ppm)

0

0

1.55

0.155

Timeline

21

1.8

Concentration (ppm)

1.6
1.4
y = 0.369x + 2E-16
R² = 1

1.2
1
0.8

y = -0.1661x + 2.2475
R² = 1

0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0
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8

10

12

14

Time (hr)

Figure 6. Approximation of concentrations of flowback fluid at the monitoring station using a
scalene triangle. The first point (t = 0) is the instant the leading edge of the plume
reaches the monitoring station. The middle point (t = 4.2 hr) is point at which the peak
concentration arrives. The final point (t = 12.6 hr) is the point at which the
concentration is reduced to 10% of the peak.
Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) found significant correlations between changes in pH and
specific conductivity, and increasing concentrations of production fluid. According to the US
EPA (2016), flowback and production fluid may be compositionally similar, so the relationships
found by Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) for production fluid were used to simulate water quality
response to flowback fluid. Using data from those lab experiments, regression equations were
developed to estimate the response of pH and specific conductivity to the simulated
concentrations at the monitoring station.
A strong linear relationship was found between flowback fluid concentration and specific
conductivity for concentrations from 0–20 ppm (Figure 7). Because the peak concentration of the
simulated event at the monitoring station is 1.55 ppm, this linear relationship can be used to
estimate the response of specific conductivity. Before directly using this relationship though, the
regression equation was adjusted for differences in units. The measurement units used by Harris
et al. (2016a, 2016b) were microsiemens per centimeter, while the SRBC were in units of
millisiemens per centimeter. The regression equation is reduced then by a factor of 1000 to
account for this difference (Equation 4). Therefore, to predict values of specific conductivity
resulting from the simulated event concentrations, the slope of the regression was multiplied to
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the predicted concentration; this value was then added to the existing concentration value
(Equation 5).

Specific Conductivity (μS/cm)
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Figure 7. Response of specific conductivity to increasing concentrations of production fluid in
lab experiments conducted by Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b).
𝒎𝑺

𝒚 (𝒄𝒎)
𝝁𝑺
𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎𝒄𝒎

=

𝟐.𝟗𝟑𝟖
𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎

𝒙+

𝟓.𝟑𝟖𝟐𝟓
𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎

𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 = (𝑺𝒍𝒐𝒑𝒆 𝒙 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) + 𝑬𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕

(4)
(5)

Predicting the response of pH measurements to the simulated event was done similarly to
specific conductivity. Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) found that pH initially decreased linearly in
lab experiments for low concentrations of production fluid, and exponentially reached an
asymptote of approximately 6.5 with greater concentrations. Because the peak concentration of
the simulated event is low, the pH response is predicted with a linear regression for concentration
values of 0–5 ppm (Figure 8). Finally, the simulated response of pH to contaminant
concentrations at the monitoring station were calculated using Equation 5.
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Figure 8. Response of pH to increasing concentrations of flowback fluid for concentrations of 0–
5 ppm. Regression developed for the average response of all lab experiments
conducted by Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b).
Finally, having developed predictions for concentrations of flowback fluid at the
monitoring station, and the corresponding responses of the measured water quality parameters,
the event could then be simulated onto existing water quality data. For this simulation, the center
of the 2012 Meshoppen Creek water quality data set was arbitrarily selected. Thus, the simulated
event was set to occur on July 1, 2012 at time step 12:00:00. The travel time from the spill to the
monitoring station was estimated to be 33.4 hr (Table 5). Therefore, the leading edge of the
plume reaches the monitoring station on July 2, 2012 at time step 21:20:00. The event then
continues until the predicted contaminant concentration reaches 0 ppm, which occurs on July 3,
2012 at time step 14:35:00. Water quality data from this time period was then used in
conjunction with the aforementioned methods to simulate the contaminant passing by the
monitoring station (Figure 9). These new water quality values then replaced the measurements
from the raw data set for this time period.
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Figure 9. The simulated water quality values for the duration of the simulated event from. t = 0
corresponds to the arrival of the leading edge of the plume on July 2, 2012 at time step
21:20:00.
3.4 Event Detection with CANARY
The CANARY EDS gives the user the ability to adjust the key parameters used in event
detection. These parameters affect the sensitivity, type and duration of event to detect, and the
timeliness of event detection. The controlling parameters are the history window, outlier
threshold, probability threshold, and the BED window. The US EPA (2010) has done extensive
analysis determining effective guidelines for the history window. Therefore, the history window
was held constant at two days (576 time steps) for all trials. The other three parameters are to be
adjusted by the user for their desired level of sensitivity.
For this study, these three parameters were varied to provide several levels of sensitivity
to event detection and gain insight into how these parameters influence the number of false
alarms produced. First, the outlier threshold was varied from 0.5σ–3.0σ (where  = standard
deviation of the history window) in increments of 0.5σ. Next, the probability threshold was
varied from 0.85–0.99 in increments of 0.05. Lastly, the following BED windows were used: 1
hour (12 time steps), 4 hours (48 time steps), 8 hours (96 time steps), and 12 hours (144 time
steps). The BED window was varied at 4-hour intervals to evaluate the performance of event
detection at significantly different lengths of the BED window. A maximum BED window of 12
25

hours was chosen based on: i) travel time estimates for the Meshoppen event (Table 5), and ii) a
12-hour BED causes significant delay between the contaminant reaching the monitoring station
and detection of the event. Thus, a 12-hour BED is long enough to capture the entire duration of
an event in a smaller watershed, and using a larger BED window is impractical to the goals
associated with event detection.
For each analyzed data set (i.e., three case studies and simulated spill), each possible
combination of outlier threshold, probability threshold, and BED window was run as a trial.
Therefore, 24 trials were conducted for each BED window (Table 6).

BED-Window

Table 6. The experimental design matrix for each value of BED window
tested. There were 24 trials conducted for each BED window.

Pevent
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

0.5

1

Outlier Threshold (σ)
1.5
2

2.5

3

Additionally, each set of parameters was applied to both the LPCF and MVNN algorithms. With
two algorithms tested on each data set, four BED windows for each algorithm, and 24 trials per
BED window, a total of 192 event detection trials were conducted per site. Finally, three case
studies were analyzed, and the simulated data set was tested before and after simulation, so a
grand total of 960 event detection trials were completed for the study.
CANARY features a user interface that asks the user to select the desired configuration
file each time event detection is completed on a data set. Filling out different configuration files
and hand selecting them for each individual trial would have been too time consuming to
complete the study. US EPA (2014) utilized a script to complete many trials at once. A similar
script was implemented for this study in Windows Powershell. With this script, only one
configuration file and one script had to be completed to conduct all 192 trials for an individual
site. The script was also written to organize the results (alarms) of all 192 trials into a single
comma delimited text file.
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CANARY analyzes incoming data based on the evaluation type each water quality
parameter is given in the configuration file. The three possible evaluation types are water quality
(wq), calibration (cal), and operational (op) (US EPA 2014). Water quality parameters which are
to be used in event detection are given the water quality evaluation type. Parameters which
should be used to calibrate event detection techniques are given the calibration evaluation type.
The operational evaluation type is given to water quality signals which are not to be used in
event detection. Harris et al. (2016a, 2016b) found that specific conductivity, pH, and dissolved
oxygen may be useful for detecting contamination events related to natural gas development.
Therefore, these three parameters were designated as water quality evaluation type, while
temperature and turbidity were designated as operational signals for all trials. No data was used
for calibration.
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4.0 Results and Discussion
4.1 Case Studies
4.1.1 Meshoppen Creek
Event detection results varied for the detection of the 23.8 m3 spill of flowback fluid in
Meshoppen Creek. Previous research suggests that the spill would impact measurements of
specific conductivity and pH (Harris et al., 2016b). In the week following the spill event (week
2), MVNN algorithms with outlier threshold set to 1.0σ were the only algorithms which detected
any events; the LPCF algorithm did not detect any events near the known spill date. Across these
MVNN algorithms, the range of alarms per week for the second week was 4–10 alarms per trial
(Figure 10). While it is possible that these alarms could be in response to the reported
contamination event, it is impossible to distinguish this with confidence. Trials in which the
outlier threshold is set to 1.0σ produced a significant number of false alarms throughout the
entirety of the year where there were no reported events (Figure 10 – Figure 14). Therefore, the
event was not successfully detected in this spill of flowback fluid for either algorithm.
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Figure 10. Weekly number of alarms produced by each trial of the MVNN algorithm with
outlier threshold set to 1.0σ. Alarms resulting from the reported event were expected
in week 2. BED corresponds to the length of the BED window in time steps, and
P(event) represents the probability threshold for each trial.
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Figure 11. CANARY output plot for Meshoppen Creek during the first quarter of 2011: BED =
1 hr, outlier threshold = 1.0σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are shown
in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event has
occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an event
was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to water
quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 12. CANARY output plot for Meshoppen Creek during the second quarter of 2011: BED
= 1 hr, outlier threshold = 1.0σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are
shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event
has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an
event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to
water quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 13. CANARY output plot for Meshoppen Creek during the third quarter of 2011: BED =
1 hr, outlier threshold = 1.0σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are shown
in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event has
occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an event
was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to water
quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 14. CANARY output plot for Meshoppen Creek during the fourth quarter of 2011: BED
= 1 hr, outlier threshold = 1.0σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are
shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event
has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an
event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to
water quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
In application of an EDS, a high false alarm rate is impractical. An EDS manager must be
able to examine water quality data at the time of an alarm and quickly distinguish if the alarm
was the result of possible contamination, or if it is the result of natural variability (e.g. sudden
increase in flow rate) or sensor malfunction. Therefore, it is likely that water quality managers
would not implement such sensitive algorithms on natural streams, and can be concluded that the
Meshoppen Creek event was not able to be detected by CANARY for the trials implemented in
this study.
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Although the Meshoppen Creek event could not be detected, the results of all trials
provide insight into the behavior of CANARY at different parameter configurations (Table 7 and
Table 8). Outlier threshold and BED window had the greatest impact on the sensitivity of
CANARY to event detection. Probability threshold does have some impact on the number of
alarms produced but is substantially less significant than the other two parameters. For example,
the LPCF algorithm produced 159 alarms with outlier threshold = 0.5σ, BED window = 12 time
steps (1 hour), and probability threshold = 0.85. When the probability threshold was increased to
the maximum of 0.99, the number of alarms is only reduced by 27. However, when the outlier
threshold was increased to 1.0σ, the total number of alarms decreased by 110. Similarly,
increasing the BED window to 48 time steps (4 hours) decreased the total number of alarms by
65 (Table 7). Furthermore, at higher values of outlier threshold and BED window, the number of
alarms does not change with probability threshold (Table 7 and Table 8).
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Table 7. Results for all Meshoppen Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold

1.5

2

2.5

3

Total Number of Alarms

0.85

159

49

31

22

19

15

0.9

159

49

31

22

19

15

0.95

148

47

27

21

16

12

0.99

132

44

26

19

15

12

0.85

94

31

16

15

11

10

0.9

94

31

16

15

11

10

0.95

94

29

15

14

10

9

0.99

84

27

14

13

10

9

0.85

77

25

14

11

10

9

0.9

75

25

14

11

10

9

0.95

76

25

14

11

10

9

0.99

68

25

14

11

10

9

0.85

62

23

13

10

9

8

0.9

65

23

13

10

9

8

0.95

62

23

13

10

9

8

0.99

62

23

13

10

9

8
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Table 8. Results for all Meshoppen Creek trials using the MVNN algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold

1.5

2

2.5

3

Total Number of Alarms

0.85

152

167

35

24

19

16

0.9

152

167

35

24

19

16

0.95

143

163

33

21

16

12

0.99

136

158

31

21

16

12

0.85

105

116

21

15

11

9

0.9

105

116

21

15

11

9

0.95

103

114

21

15

11

9

0.99

102

113

19

15

11

9

0.85

88

96

19

15

11

9

0.9

88

95

19

15

11

9

0.95

87

93

19

15

11

9

0.99

85

89

19

15

11

9

0.85

74

83

18

12

10

8

0.9

72

82

18

12

10

8

0.95

71

80

18

12

10

8

0.99

70

80

17

12

10

8

It should be noted that while the length of the BED window clearly has an impact on the
sensitivity of event detection, it should generally be set small enough for the duration of an event
one hopes to detect, and time of response to an event desired (US EPA 2014). The outlier
threshold parameter will then likely be more important to sensitivity adjustments.
As the outlier threshold was increased, the decrease in sensitivity was exponential for the
LPCF algorithm (Figure 15). However, this trend was not followed for this data set using the
MVNN algorithm (Figure 16). The MVNN algorithm with outlier threshold = 1.0σ was the most
sensitive to event detection. Considering the role the outlier threshold fulfills in event detection,
this result is unexpected; a decreasing trend as found in the LPCF algorithm was expected
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(Figure 15). Configuration files for the MVNN algorithm trials with outlier threshold = 1.0σ
were inspected for errors, but none were found. Interestingly, the MVNN algorithms with outlier
threshold = 1.0σ were also the only algorithms to produce any alarms during the week of
expected response from the event.
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Figure 15. Decreasing trend of number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for Meshoppen
Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm. The average number of alarms was taken
across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter has little
impact on sensitivity.
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Figure 16. Trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for Meshoppen Creek trials
using the MVNN algorithm. The average number of alarms was taken across all
values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter has little impact on
sensitivity. Unlike the LPCF algorithm, the number of alarms increases from 0.5σ to
1.0σ.
4.1.2 Hammond Creek
Analysis of the Hammond Creek data set yielded similar results to what was found in the
analysis of the Meshoppen Creek data set. If the EDS were to detect the contamination event,
alarms from the CANARY EDS would be expected during the following week (week 3).
Previous research suggests that the spill would impact measurements of specific conductivity and
pH (Harris et al., 2016b). CANARY only detected events during week 3 with the MVNN
algorithm with outlier threshold of 0.5σ, and BED window less than or equal to 4 hours (48 time
steps). However, the MVNN algorithm with outlier threshold of 0.5σ produced too many false
alarms throughout the year to confidently say that the week 3 alarms are the result of the
contamination event (Figure 17 – Figure 21). For practical purposes then, it could be concluded
that the reported Hammond Creek contamination event (7.9 m3 of production fluid) was not
detected by the CANARY EDS.
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Figure 17. Weekly number of alarms produced by each trial of the MVNN algorithm with
outlier threshold set to 0.5σ for Hammond Creek. Alarms resulting from the reported
event were expected in week 3. BED corresponds to the length of the BED window in
time steps, and P(event) represents the probability threshold for each trial.
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Figure 18. CANARY output plot for Hammond Creek during the first quarter of 2011: BED = 1
hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are shown
in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event has
occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an event
was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to water
quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 19. CANARY output plot for Hammond Creek during the second quarter of 2011: BED
= 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are
shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event
has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an
event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to
water quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 20. CANARY output plot for Hammond Creek during the third quarter of 2011: BED = 1
hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are shown
in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event has
occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an event
was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to water
quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 21. CANARY output plot for Hammond Creek during the fourth quarter of 2011: BED =
1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality measurements are shown
in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the probability that an event has
occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality plots with which an event
was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot” symbol is added to water
quality plots for which an event was detected using the LPCF algorithm.
Behaviors in event detection sensitivity to the adjustment of the outlier threshold,
probability threshold, and BED window for the Hammond Creek trials were similar to those in
the Meshoppen Creek trials (Table 9 and Table 10). The sensitivity of the LPCF algorithm with
increasing outlier threshold exhibits the same behavior (Figure 22). However, unlike the
Meshoppen Creek trials, the sensitivity of CANARY to event detection decreased exponentially
for the MVNN algorithm with increasing outlier threshold (Figure 23).
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Table 9. Results for all Hammond Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold
(σ)
Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

11
11
11
11
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

10
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Total Number of Alarms
71
71
68
67
50
50
50
49
41
41
41
40
39
39
39
38

25
25
23
23
21
21
21
21
18
18
18
18
16
16
16
16
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16
16
15
15
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12

11
11
11
11
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7

Table 10. The results for all Hammond Creek trials using the MVNN algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)
Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

12
12
12
12
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7

12
12
11
11
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7

Total Number of Alarms
89
89
89
87
66
66
66
66
59
58
57
55
54
53
53
51

35
35
34
34
29
29
28
28
26
25
25
25
22
22
21
21

14
14
15
15
13
13
13
13
12
12
12
12
11
11
11
11

12
12
12
12
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
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Figure 22. Decreasing trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the Hammond
Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm. The average number of alarms was taken
across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter has little
impact on sensitivity.
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Figure 23. Decreasing trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the Hammond
Creek Trials using the MVNN algorithm. The average number of alarms was taken
across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter has little
impact on sensitivity.
4.1.3 East Branch of Wyalusing Creek
Unlike the first two case studies, CANARY produced no alarms during the week
following the reported 20.7 m3 spill of drilling mud in the East Branch of Wyalusing Creek.
Previous research suggests that the spill would impact measurements of specific conductivity,
pH, and dissolved oxygen (Harris et al., 2016b). There was an event detected for several trials on
October 31, 2013, 9 days after the reported event. However, upon closer examination of the
CANARY output plots at the time of the alarm, these alarms appear to result from a malfunction
of the sensor (Figure 24). Temperature, specific conductivity, pH, and dissolved oxygen all
exhibit a “spike” behavior at the time of the alarm. Specific conductivity, the parameter for
which the event was detected in Figure 24, rapidly and unnaturally drops from approximately
0.15 mS/cm to 0 mS/cm. Therefore, it was concluded that the reported contamination event was
not detected by the trials implemented in this study.
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Figure 24. CANARY output plot for East Branch of Wyalusing Creek during the week of
October 29, 2013 to November 5, 2013: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 3.0σ,
P(event) = 0.99. Water quality measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The
lower two plots show the probability that an event has occurred. Markers for both the
LPCF and MVNN algorithms indicate an event was detected 9 days after spill was
reported, even on the least sensitive algorithms.
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Behavior of event detection sensitivity for the East Branch of Wyalusing Creek trials was
similar to that of the Hammond Creek trials. Again, more sensitive algorithms are characterized
by high numbers of false alarms (Figure 25 – Figure 28). Sensitivity adjustments are dominated
by the outlier threshold for both the LPCF and MVNN algorithms, while the probability
threshold affects the number of alarms substantially less (Table 11 and Table 12). Additionally,
the relationship between sensitivity and outlier threshold could be characterized as
approximately exponentially decreasing for both algorithms (Figure 29 and Figure 30).
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Figure 25. CANARY output plot for East Branch of Wyalusing Creek during the first quarter of
2013: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality
measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the
probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality
plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot”
symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected using the
LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 26. CANARY output plot for East Branch of Wyalusing Creek during the second quarter
of 2013: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality
measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the
probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality
plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot”
symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected using the
LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 27. CANARY output plot for East Branch of Wyalusing Creek during the third quarter of
2013: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality
measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the
probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality
plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot”
symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected using the
LPCF algorithm.
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Figure 28. CANARY output plot for East Branch of Wyalusing Creek during the fourth quarter
of 2013: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90. Water quality
measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots show the
probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to water quality
plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A blue “dot”
symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected using the
LPCF algorithm.
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Table 11. Results for all East Branch of Wyalusing Creek trials using the LPCF
algorithm.
BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)
Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

12
12
13
13
9
9
9
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6

12
12
12
12
9
9
9
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6

Total Number of Alarms
157
157
148
144
103
103
99
98
81
78
77
75
67
67
67
64

61
61
59
59
39
39
37
34
22
22
21
19
16
16
16
16

53

26
26
26
26
17
17
15
13
9
9
9
7
7
7
7
7

14
14
15
15
11
11
10
9
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6

Table 12. Results for all East Branch of Wyalusing Creek trials using the MVNN
algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

1.5

2

2.5

3

10
10
10
10
8
8
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

10
10
9
9
8
8
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Total Number of Alarms
140
140
132
125
88
88
85
83
74
75
73
70
63
62
63
63

87
87
86
85
64
64
60
58
44
44
44
43
37
36
36
36

54

20
20
19
19
13
13
12
11
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8

12
12
12
12
9
9
9
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Average No. of Alarms

160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0

0.5

1

BED = 12

1.5
2
Outlier Threshold
BED = 48

BED = 96

2.5

3

3.5

BED = 144

Figure 29. Decreasing trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the East Branch
of Wyalusing Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm. The average number of alarms
was taken across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter
has little impact on sensitivity.
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Figure 30. Decreasing trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the East Branch
of Wyalusing Creek trials using the MVNN algorithm. The average number of alarms
was taken across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter
has little impact on sensitivity.
4.2 Simulated Flowback Fluid Event
Results for the simulated spill of 23.8 m3 of flowback fluid come from two data sets: the
“clean” data which is the raw data from the SRBC with no reported significant contamination
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events, and the “simulated” data which features the imposed contamination event onto specific
conductivity and pH as previously described. Conclusions regarding event detection sensitivity
were drawn from the results of the clean data set. Finally, the clean and simulated data set results
were compared at the time of the simulated event to decide if the CANARY EDS detected the
simulated event for any of the trials.
4.2.1 Meshoppen Creek 2012: Clean Data Set
The behavior of the EDS with respect to alteration of outlier threshold, probability
threshold, and BED window was the same as the Meshoppen Creek case study. The main
difference between the two is that there were substantially fewer alarms overall, especially for
the more sensitive algorithms with lower outlier thresholds (Table 13 and Table 14). This is
likely the result of less natural variability and sensor malfunction throughout the data set.
Table 13. Results from all Meshoppen Creek 2012 trials before event simulation using the
LPCF algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

1.5

2

2.5

3

8
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Total Number of Alarms
53
53
51
51
40
40
40
40
36
36
36
36
34
34
34
34

22
22
20
20
16
16
16
15
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
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12
12
12
12
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

8
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Table 14. Results from all Meshoppen Creek 2012 trials before event simulation using the
MVNN algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

1.5

2

2.5

3

11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

9
9
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Total Number of Alarms
70
70
68
66
56
56
54
53
48
48
48
46
43
43
42
40

83
83
83
81
67
67
65
63
57
57
57
54
48
47
47
44

18
18
16
16
13
13
13
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11

12
12
11
11
11
11
11
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

The sensitivity to event detection decreased exponentially for the LPCF algorithm
(Figure 31). This result is consistent with all of the case studies. For the MVNN algorithm
however, the behavior was similar to the Meshoppen Creek case study where the algorithm is
most sensitive to event detection when the outlier threshold is set equal to 1.0σ (Figure 16 and
Figure 32). Again, the configuration files were inspected for errors on these trials but none were
found.
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Figure 31. Decreasing trend in number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the clean 2012
Meshoppen Creek trials using the LPCF algorithm. The average number of alarms
was taken across all values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter
has little impact on sensitivity.
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Figure 32. Number of alarms versus the outlier threshold for the clean 2012 Meshoppen Creek
trials using the MVNN algorithm. The average number of alarms was taken across all
values of probability threshold since it was found that parameter has little impact on
sensitivity. Unlike the LPCF algorithm, the number of alarms increases from 0.5σ to
1.0σ.
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4.2.2 Meshoppen Creek 2012: Simulated Data Set
Results from the data set featuring the simulated event were almost identical to those
from the clean data set. For all trials of the MVNN, the number of detected events from the
simulated data set were the same as those from the clean data set (Table 16). The same occurred
for the LPCF algorithm with the exception of all trials whose outlier threshold was set to 2.5σ
(Table 15). Each trial using the LPCF algorithm with outlier threshold set to 2.5σ detected one
less event when compared to the clean data set (Table 17). Thus, 16 less events were detected in
total.
Table 15. Results from all Meshoppen Creek 2012 trials after event simulation using the
LPCF algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

1.5

2

2.5

3

7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

7
7
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Total Number of Alarms
53
53
51
51
40
40
40
40
36
36
36
36
34
34
34
34

22
22
20
20
16
16
16
15
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
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12
12
12
12
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

8
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

Table 16. Results from all Meshoppen Creek 2012 trials after event simulation using the
MVNN algorithm.

BED Window
(Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Outlier
Threshold (σ)

0.5

1

Probability
Threshold
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

1.5

2

2.5

3

11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

9
9
9
9
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Total Number of Alarms
70
70
68
66
56
56
54
53
48
48
48
46
43
43
42
40

83
83
83
81
67
67
65
63
57
57
57
54
48
47
47
44

60

18
18
16
16
13
13
13
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11

12
12
11
11
11
11
11
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

Table 17. Net alarms for the LPCF algorithm with outlier threshold set to 2.5σ following
the implemented changes to water quality data as a result of the simulated event.
All alarm changes occurred during the time of event simulation.

BED Window (Time Steps)

12

48

96

144

Probability Threshold

Net Alarms (Clean - Simulated)

0.85
0.9
0.95

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99
0.85
0.9
0.95
0.99

Interestingly, the 16 events which were not detected in the simulated data set occurred
during the time period in which the simulated event was imposed upon the raw data. For both the
clean and simulated data sets, several trials of both algorithms detected an event on July 3, 2012.
Events were detected at this time as the result of decreasing specific conductivity. For both data
sets, these events were detected at all variations of BED window and probability threshold. On
the clean data set, both the LPCF and MVNN algorithms detected this event for all outlier
threshold values up to 2.5σ (Figure 33). On the simulated dataset, results from the MVNN
algorithm did not change. However, the LPCF algorithm only detected the event for algorithms
with outlier threshold up to 2.0σ on the simulated data set (Figure 34). Since the only difference
in these two trials is the imposed changes to water quality data from the simulated event, it was
concluded that in this particular case, the simulated contamination event inhibited event
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detection by the LPCF algorithm. Because event simulation caused an increase in specific
conductivity data, the measurements became more similar to background data and an event could
no longer be declared when the outlier threshold was set to 2.5σ.

Figure 33. CANARY output plot for the clean Meshoppen Creek clean data set during the week
of July 1, 2012 to July 8, 2012: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 2.5σ, P(event) = 0.90.
Water quality measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots
show the probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to
water quality plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A
blue “dot” symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected
using the LPCF algorithm. The red box indicates the time frame of event simulation.
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Figure 34. CANARY output plot for the simulated event on Meshoppen Creek during the week
of July 1, 2012 to July 8, 2012: BED = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 2.5σ, P(event) = 0.90.
Water quality measurements are shown in the upper five plots. The lower two plots
show the probability that an event has occurred. A blue “plus” symbol is added to
water quality plots with which an event was detected using the MVNN algorithm. A
blue “dot” symbol is added to water quality plots for which an event was detected
using the LPCF algorithm. The red box indicates the time frame of event simulation.
Overall, there were no additional alarms from CANARY on the simulated data set
resulting from the imposed changes to water quality data. It was concluded then that the
CANARY EDS was unable to detect the simulated event. With certainty that water quality
measurements of pH and specific conductivity were affected by the simulated event, it can be
concluded that these changes were not significant enough for CANARY to detect the event for
the trials tested. This indicates that the CANARY EDS may be ineffective on natural channels
when contaminant concentrations are low.
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5.0 Discussion
5.1 Event Detection in Natural Channels
Most event detection systems, including CANARY, have been developed for use in
municipal water supply (pipe flow) systems (US EPA 2010). While these conditions provide
water quality variability resulting from changes in demand and distribution network operations,
they are generally more predictable and stable than water quality measurements in a natural
channel. Water quality measurements in natural channels are prone to variability resulting from
ever-changing hydrologic conditions. For example, pH may be relatively stable in a pipe flow
system, but in a natural channel exhibits strong diurnal periodicity (Figure 33 and Figure 34).
Other factors, such as precipitation and flow rate can have strong effects on water quality
parameters (Gerner and Waddel 2003 and Gasim et al. 2006). Small watersheds, like those used
in this study, are especially prone to rapid changes as the timescale of hydrologic change is much
smaller. For example, the time to peak discharge in a stream is greatly impacted by the size of
the watershed. On small watersheds, the time to peak discharge will, in most cases, be much
smaller than it would on large watersheds (USGS 2018). Since these hydrologic characteristics
are subject to rapid changes, the effects they impose on water quality measurements are as well.
Therefore, event detection in natural channels is inherently more challenging than in pipe
systems as it is more difficult to distinguish changes due to natural variability from those due to a
contamination event.
5.2 Implications for future event detection
Although CANARY was unsuccessful at detecting the historic and simulated events in
this study, it may still be a viable option as an early warning system to acute contamination
events. Because reported details from the historic events in this study are limited, it cannot be
guaranteed that the entire reported contaminant volumes were spilled directly into the streams.
Thus, the predicted concentrations may be overestimated. Unless these key details can be
guaranteed, future work should focus on the use of simulated events. By using simulated events,
the user gains control over the concentrations reported at the monitoring station, providing the
study with enhanced flexibility. With the ability to adjust the magnitude of contamination
impacts, future work should focus on determining the minimum contaminant concentration
which can be detected by CANARY, the maximum watershed monitoring size based on historic
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event volumes and concentration estimates, and optimizing CANARY for use in natural
channels.
In this study, the simulated event was based on details from one of the case studies.
Future work should use similar estimation methods for concentration, but vary the size of the
spills, and the distance traveled to the sensor. Varying these two parameters will provide a range
of different peak concentrations and contaminant durations at the monitoring station. Then, by
imposing a wide range of simulated events, the minimum event size detectable by CANARY
could be determined. From these conclusions, further insight could be gained by relating the
minimum event size to watershed size. If an approximate peak concentration and event duration
are determined, the methods presented by Jobson (1997) could be used to predict the appropriate
maximum monitored drainage area. Following determination of maximum monitored drainage
area, CANARY should be optimized to achieve high rates of event detection and low false alarm
rates.
Optimization of CANARY can be achieved by multiple methods. First, the configuration
parameters can be used to adjust sensitivity and reduce the number of false alarms. The outlier
threshold had the greatest effect on the number of events reported throughout the trials of this
study. Trials using outlier thresholds less than 1.5σ tend to produce an excessive number of false
alarms throughout the year. For most trials, the number of reported alarms became minimized at
outlier threshold values of approximately 2σ – 2.5σ. Therefore, it is recommended to use outlier
thresholds greater than 1.5σ when working with natural channels. While the BED window has an
effect on sensitivity at lower values of outlier threshold, this affect fades away with less sensitive
algorithms who produce fewer false alarms. The main effect of BED window at higher values of
outlier threshold is the timing of event reporting. This is because it requires more time steps for
an event to be declared at higher values of BED window. Additionally, using large BED
windows, such as 8 – 12 hr, could be susceptible to false negatives for events of shorter time
frames, such as a spill occurring very close to the monitoring station. Therefore, a shorter BED
window of approximately 1 hr is recommended. The tested values of probability threshold
showed little variation in the number of false alarms. US EPA (2014) implemented significantly
smaller values of probability threshold on municipal distribution networks than those tested here.
While this may be a possible optimization adjustment, higher thresholds, such as those tested in
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this study, are likely necessary to aid in reducing the number of false alarms resulting from water
quality variability in natural channels.
In addition to using the three discussed configuration parameters for optimization,
calibration signals may also be useful. CANARY was designed with the ability to accept data
input, such as flow rate or other utility operating parameters, and use them to calibrate the event
detection algorithms (US EPA 2010). This was done to help distribution network managers
reduce the number of false alarms resulting from expected changes in daily utility operations.
Since water quality data in natural channels can vary with hydrologic changes, such hydrologic
data may be useful as a calibration signal. For example, high flows have the potential to rapidly
change water chemistry and therefore water quality measurements. Therefore, using flow rate
data as a calibration signal may prove extremely useful. The difficulty in this will be obtaining
these data on the same time scale as the incoming water quality data. The watersheds of interest
in this study are all small watersheds with no USGS gaging station available. While
extrapolating gaged stream data to these ungagged watersheds has been done (Harris et al.
2016a, 2016b), the data are not measured at a fine enough time scale for use as a calibration
signal. Therefore, developing methods to quantify hydrologic changes in a watershed on the
same time scale as incoming water quality data may be of future concern.
Finally, other optimization techniques could include creating custom algorithms, and
using CANARY’s pattern matching capabilities. CANARY gives the user the ability to write
algorithms which perform outlier classification, like the built-in the LPCF and MVNN
algorithms. Algorithms must be written in JAVA and specified in the configuration file (US EPA
2012). The LPCF algorithm uses an AR model to predict future concentrations for comparison to
measured water quality values. Other model types should be explored by future users in attempt
to create better predictions for the natural environment setting. If an algorithm could be found to
create better predictions in response to natural variability, it may be possible to decrease the
outlier threshold and implement more sensitive algorithms without increasing the false alarm
rate. Additionally, pattern matching techniques could be explored to reduce the number of false
alarms. CANARY provides the user with the ability to create a library of typical changes in
water quality that should not be signified as an event (US EPA 2010). For example, if a water
quality sensor malfunction can be characterized by a brief spike in the parameters, this behavior
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could be saved into the pattern library for comparison in event detection. Then, when the EDS is
implemented with pattern matching enabled, all detected events would be compared to the
malfunction in the pattern library. If a detected event is then matched to that pattern, CANARY
will not signal an alarm, thereby eliminating false alarms matching this type of sensor
malfunction behavior.
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6.0 Conclusions
Little is known about the application of EDS in natural systems. In this study, an EDS
was applied to three case studies with reported contamination events (i.e., production fluid,
flowback fluid, and drilling mud), and one simulated event. In the Meshoppen and Hammond
Creek case studies, CANARY detected events in the week following the reported spills.
However, the only events during this time were reported for the most sensitive of algorithms.
These algorithms were found to report numerous false alarms throughout the year, making them
impractical for their designed purpose. Therefore, it was concluded that the EDS was unable to
detect the reported contamination events on Meshoppen and Hammond Creek. In the East
Branch of Wyalusing Creek case study, an event was detected by several trials, including some
of the least sensitive algorithms, nine days following the reported event. However, upon
inspection of water quality data at this time (Figure 24), it is evident that these alarms occur as a
result of sensor malfunction. Having detected no other events during the week following the
spill, it was concluded that the CANARY EDS was unable to detect the reported contamination
event on East Branch of Wyalusing Creek. Therefore, none of the tested historical events were
able to be detected for the trials of the CANARY EDS implemented.
Following analysis of the three case studies, event characteristics of the Meshoppen
Creek contamination event were used to simulate the effects of a contamination event on a data
set where no significant events are known to be present. The goal of the simulated event was to
provide event detection analysis on a dataset where changes to water quality data resulting from
a contamination event are guaranteed. After analyzing the data with CANARY before and after
the event was imposed on the data set, it was concluded that the simulated event was not
detected. In fact, the effects of the simulated event inhibited event detection of a false alarm by
the LPCF algorithm with outlier threshold set to 2.5σ (Figure 33 and Figure 34). Because no
additional events were detected during the simulated event, it can be concluded that the change
imposed on water quality data as a result of the simulated contaminant concentration was not
great enough for the CANARY EDS to declare the change an event for any of the trials
implemented. Therefore, greater contaminant concentrations are most likely necessary for these
events to be detected by CANARY.
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Ensuring greater concentrations of contaminants at sensors requires either the sensor to
be placed closer to the spill event, or a much larger spill event. The three dominating factors of
pollutant concentration downstream of a spill are the distance traveled by the pollutant, the
quantity spilled, and the flow rate of the stream at the time of the spill. Higher flow rates provide
greater velocities and decreased travel times, but also more dilution. Lower flow rates ensure
greater concentrations initially as dilution is much more limited, but slower velocities increase
contaminant travel times and make them more prone to losses from decay and/or settling.
Increased spill volume may provide enhanced event detection further downstream but would be
ecologically problematic. Therefore, the best solution to achieve greater contaminant
concentrations at monitoring stations is to increase the monitoring presence on watersheds where
spills are of concern.
The CANARY EDS was incapable of detecting any of the events presented in this study.
However, using simulated events in conjunction with some of CANARY’s more advanced event
detection capabilities may provide contamination event detection solutions for natural channels.
The application of CANARY in this study has been narrowly focused on contamination resulting
from natural gas development in the Marcellus Shale play, but future work with this software
need not be limited to this industry. The basic principle of the CANARY EDS is to detect
changes in water quality data which are not congruent with background data. Thus, it may be
possible to apply these event detection techniques to contamination events from a multitude of
sources, so long as there is a measurable response by water quality parameters to the contaminant
and high frequency water quality measurements are available.
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Appendix A: CANARY Configuration File Used with Script (Hammond
Creek)
--- # CANARY Config File
canary:
run mode: BATCH
control type: INTERNAL
control messenger: null
driver files: null
# Enter the time step options below according to format of data
timing options:
dynamic start-stop: off
date-time format: mm/dd/yyyy HH:MM:SS
date-time start: 01/01/2011 00:00:00
date-time stop:
12/31/2011 23:55:00
data interval: 00:05:00
message interval: 00:00:01
# Enter the list of data sources below
data sources:
- id: hammond_in
type
: csv
location
:
C:\Users\user\Documents\MyCANARY\research\data\hammond/hammond.c
sv
enabled
: yes
timestep options:
field: "TIME_STEP"
# Enter the list of signals and their defined evaluation type
below
# evaluation type wq parameters are used for detection. op are
not used for detection. cal signals are used for calibration and
not detection
signals:
- id: TEST_TEMP
SCADA tag: TEMP_VAL
evaluation type: op
parameter type: TEMP
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'deg_C'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
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- id: TEST_TURB
SCADA tag: TURB_VAL
evaluation type: op
parameter type: TURB
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.1
units: 'NTU'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_COND
SCADA tag: COND_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: SP_COND
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.001
units: '{\mu}S/cm'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_PH
SCADA tag: PH_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: PH
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'pH'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_DO
SCADA tag: DO_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: DO
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'mg/L'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
# Enter the list of event detection algorithms below
algorithms:
- id: test_LPCF
75

type: LPCF
history window: 576
outlier threshold: OTT
event threshold: ETT
event timeout: 12
event window save: 1
BED:
window: BBED
outlier probability: 0.5
- id: test_MVNN
type: MVNN
history window: 576
outlier threshold: OTT
event threshold: ETT
event timeout: 12
event window save: 1
BED:
window: BBED
outlier probability: 0.5
# Enter the list of monitoring stations below
monitoring stations:
- id: hammond_SRBC
station id number:
station tag name: hammond
location id number: -1
enabled: yes
inputs:
- id: hammond_in
outputs:
signals:
- id: TEST_TEMP
- id: TEST_TURB
- id: TEST_COND
- id: TEST_PH
- id: TEST_DO
cluster: no
algorithms:
- id: test_LPCF
- id: test_MVNN
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Appendix B: Example Powershell Script Used to Complete Trials (Hammond
Creek)
"Start date and time is: $((Get-Date).ToString())"
$ot="0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0"
$bed="12 48 96 144"
$et="0.85 0.9 0.95 0.99"
foreach ($l1 in $ot.Split(" ")) {
foreach ($l2 in $bed.Split(" ")) {
foreach ($l3 in $et.Split(" "))
{
$foldername1 =
("Hamm_"+$l1+"_"+$l2+"_"+$l3)
mkdir $foldername1
cd $foldername1
echo $foldername1
cp
C:\Users\user\Documents\MyCANARY\research\config\Hammond\Hammond
_script.yml
cat Hammond_script.yml | %{ $_ replace 'BBED', ($l2)} > temp1.yml
cat temp1.yml | %{ $_ -replace
'OTT', ($l1)} >temp2.yml
cat temp2.yml | %{ $_ -replace
'ETT', ("$l3")} >temp1.yml
cmd /c "type temp1.yml >
Hammond_script.yml"
rm temp*
cd ..
}
}
}
$folders= ls Hamm_* -Name
$j=1
foreach ($i in $folders) {
cd $i
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files
(x86)\CANARY\bin\canary.exe' Hammond_script.yml
cd ..
$j++
while ($j -gt 3) {
Start-Sleep -s 60
$j=(ps | findstr "canary").length
if ($j -gt 30) {$j = 1}
}
}
while ($j -gt 0) {
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Start-Sleep -s 60
$j=(ps | findstr "canary").length
}
foreach ($i in $folders) {
cd $i
findstr "test_LPCF" .\Hammond_script.hammond_SRBC.summary.txt |
%{ $a+=$_.Split('||')[6]; $b+=$_.Split('||')[22];
$c+=$_.Split('||')[24]; $d+=$_.Split('||')[26]; if ($a)
{"$i,$a,$b,$c,$d"};$a=$b=$c=$d=""}>> .\summary.txt
findstr "test_MVNN" .\Hammond_script.hammond_SRBC.summary.txt |
%{ $a+=$_.Split('||')[6]; $b+=$_.Split('||')[22];
$c+=$_.Split('||')[24]; $d+=$_.Split('||')[26]; if ($a)
{"$i,$a,$b,$c,$d"};$a=$b=$c=$d=""}>> .\summary2.txt
cd ..
}
echo "Hamm, LPCF, MVNN" > results.txt
foreach ($i in $folders) {
cd $i
$lpcf=(cat .\summary.txt).length
$mvnn=(cat .\summary2.txt).length
echo "$i, $lpcf, $mvnn" >> ..\results.txt
Get-Content .\summary.txt | Add-Content ..\LPCF_alarms.txt
Get-Content .\summary2.txt | Add-Content ..\MVNN_alarms.txt
cd ..
}
"Stop date and time is: $((Get-Date).ToString())"
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Appendix C: CANARY Configuration File Written from Script (Hammond
Creek, BED window = 1 hr, outlier threshold = 0.5σ, P(event) = 0.90)
--- # CANARY Config File
canary:
run mode: BATCH
control type: INTERNAL
control messenger: null
driver files: null
# Enter the time step options below according to format of data
timing options:
dynamic start-stop: off
date-time format: mm/dd/yyyy HH:MM:SS
date-time start: 01/01/2011 00:00:00
date-time stop:
12/31/2011 23:55:00
data interval: 00:05:00
message interval: 00:00:01
# Enter the list of data sources below
data sources:
- id: hammond_in
type
: csv
location
:
C:\Users\user\Documents\MyCANARY\research\data\hammond/hammond.c
sv
enabled
: yes
timestep options:
field: "TIME_STEP"
# Enter the list of signals and their defined evaluation type
below
# evaluation type wq parameters are used for detection. op are
not used for detection. cal signals are used for calibration and
not detection
signals:
- id: TEST_TEMP
SCADA tag: TEMP_VAL
evaluation type: op
parameter type: TEMP
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'deg_C'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
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- id: TEST_TURB
SCADA tag: TURB_VAL
evaluation type: op
parameter type: TURB
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.1
units: 'NTU'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_COND
SCADA tag: COND_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: SP_COND
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.001
units: '{\mu}S/cm'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_PH
SCADA tag: PH_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: PH
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'pH'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
- id: TEST_DO
SCADA tag: DO_VAL
evaluation type: wq
parameter type: DO
ignore changes: none
data options:
precision: 0.01
units: 'mg/L'
valid range: [-.inf, .inf]
set points: [-.inf, .inf]
# Enter the list of event detection algorithms below
algorithms:
- id: test_LPCF
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type: LPCF
history window: 576
outlier threshold: 0.5
event threshold: 0.90
event timeout: 12
event window save: 1
BED:
window: 12
outlier probability: 0.5
- id: test_MVNN
type: MVNN
history window: 576
outlier threshold: 0.5
event threshold: 0.90
event timeout: 12
event window save: 1
BED:
window: 12
outlier probability: 0.5
# Enter the list of monitoring stations below
monitoring stations:
- id: hammond_SRBC
station id number:
station tag name: hammond
location id number: -1
enabled: yes
inputs:
- id: hammond_in
outputs:
signals:
- id: TEST_TEMP
- id: TEST_TURB
- id: TEST_COND
- id: TEST_PH
- id: TEST_DO
cluster: no
algorithms:
- id: test_LPCF
- id: test_MVNN
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